



TE-SAT 2012

EU TERRORISM SITUATION
AND TREND REPORT





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PHOTOGRAPHS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	Foreword by the Europol Director	4
2.	Key judgments	6
3.	Introduction	7
4.	General overview of the situation in the EU in 2011.....	8
4.1.	Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects	8
4.2.	Lone actors	9
4.3.	Terrorist and violent extremist activities	9
4.4.	Convictions and penalties.....	12
5.	Religiously-inspired terrorism.....	15
5.1.	Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects	15
5.2.	Terrorist activities.....	18
5.3.	Terrorist situation outside the EU.....	19
6.	Ethno nationalist and separatist terrorism	22
6.1.	Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects	22
7.	Left-wing and anarchist terrorism	26
7.1.	Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects	26
7.2.	Terrorist and violent extremist activities	27
8.	Right-wing terrorism	28
8.1.	Terrorist attacks and arrested suspects	28
8.2.	Violent right-wing extremism	28
9.	Single-issue terrorism.....	30
9.1.	Single-issue terrorist and violent extremist activities	30
10.	Trends and future outlook	32
11.	Annexes	33

1. FOREWORD BY THE EUROPOL DIRECTOR



Terrorism is the attempt to achieve political goals with the use or the threat of violence. The ideologies behind terrorism vary widely, but can be roughly divided into a number of identifiable main drivers. Examples include religiously-inspired terrorism and strong ethno-nationalist sentiments leading to separatist terrorism. The identified drivers are not static, however, and can evolve or vanish over time in response to political or socio-economic developments, merge with other ideologies or convictions, or be the building blocks of new and sometimes very specific and highly individual motivations. Unclear or vague motives can blur the distinction between a terrorist offence and other criminal acts. The bomb attack and killing spree in Norway in July 2011, referred to in this report, illustrates that a personal mix of elements from different ideologies can lead to extremely serious incidents that are difficult to foresee and prevent.

Following the attacks in Norway, Europol immediately engaged in close cooperation with Norway and the most relevant EU Member States via the First Response Network. As well as supporting the Norwegian authorities with the investigation itself, the First Response Network also assessed the implications of the attack on the threat of violent extremism to the EU.

The TE-SAT aims to provide law enforcement officials, policymakers and the general public with facts and figures regarding terrorism in the EU, while also seeking to identify trends in the development of this phenomenon. In 2011, the total number of terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU continued to decrease. This is a welcome development, but does not necessarily reflect a diminished threat. The death of Osama bin Laden has not removed the threat of al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. Instead, the threat has evolved and lone actors or small EU-based groups are becoming increasingly prominent, as is the Internet as a key facilitator for terrorism-related activities.

The incidents in Norway and the arrests in a number of Member States of individuals for the preparation of terrorist attacks are proof of a continuous need for vigilance, and indicate that the reduction of the numbers of attacks is at least partly due to effective law enforcement interventions.

The TE-SAT is a public report produced by Europol on the basis of information provided and verified by the competent law-enforcement authorities in the Member States of the EU. The arrests and terrorist or violent extremist incidents that took place in the EU, as referred to in this report, are those that Member States have reported to Europol for the purposes of the TE-SAT.

Europol could not have produced this report without the contributions of quantitative and qualitative data from Eurojust and the EU Member States. I would also like to express my gratitude to Colombia, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America for their contributions. Last but not least, I would like to thank all members of the Advisory Board, consisting of the 'Troika' (EU Council Presidencies of Poland, Denmark and Cyprus), France, Spain, Eurojust, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) and the Office of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator for their support throughout the year and their valuable contributions to the 2012 edition of the TESAT.

Rob Wainwright
Director

2. KEY JUDGMENTS

2011 presented a highly diverse terrorism picture which will probably be mirrored in 2012, with a possible increase in lone and solo actor plots.

The death of Osama bin Laden and other important terrorist leaders did not have an impact on terrorist activities carried out in the EU. However, al-Qaeda's call for individual violent jihad through the execution of small-scale attacks may result in an increase in such attacks. The more al-Qaeda's core is under pressure, and the more difficult it becomes to prepare large scale attacks, the more al-Qaeda will try to recruit individual supporters in the West to plan and execute attacks. Attacks performed by individually-operating actors are not a practice limited to al-Qaeda inspired terrorism.

Radicalisation to violence remains a critical component of the terrorist threat. Radical thinking becomes a threat when individuals or groups engage in violence to achieve political, ideological or religious goals. High-profile media exposure or propaganda efforts via the Internet may assist radicalisation and inspire further like-minded individuals to plan and commit attacks.

Terrorist and extremist groups have a substantial presence in the virtual world of the Internet.

The Internet has become the principal means of communication for terrorist and violent extremist individuals and groups. Social media tools facilitate radicalisation and recruitment for terrorist and violent extremist purposes.

Numbers of terrorist incidents and arrests continue to fall, but overall activity relating to terrorism and violent extremism still represents a significant threat to EU Member States.

Between 2009 and 2011, there has been a sustained decrease in reported attacks and arrests. Nevertheless, in 2011, a total of 174 attacks were still executed, 484 individuals were arrested and 316 individuals were charged with terrorist-related offences.

Al-Qaeda inspired groups and individuals still aim to cause mass casualties and select targets based on their perceived symbolic value. The potentially high number of victims and psychological impact can have a long-term negative effect on society.

The threat of violent right-wing extremism has reached new levels in Europe and should not be underestimated. The threat will most likely come from lone actors but organised underground groups also have the capability and intention to carry out attacks.

Cross-border cooperation between violent extremist groups, including the provision of support for violent activities, is steadily increasing. Terrorist and violent extremist groups have taken full advantage of developments in the communication and technology sector, allowing them to notify likeminded individuals and groups about upcoming activities, and inspire others by promoting the results of their activities online.

A number of developments in recent years point to a convergence of social and technological factors which may well prove fertile ground for **ideologically-motivated electronic attacks.**

3. INTRODUCTION

The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was established in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States of America (US), as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament. The content of the TE-SAT is based on information supplied by EU Member States, some third states (Colombia, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US) and partner organisations (Eurojust and Interpol), as well as information gained from open sources.

In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is produced annually to provide an overview of the terrorism phenomenon in the EU, from a law enforcement perspective. It seeks to record basic facts and assemble figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the European Union. The report also aims to present trends and new developments from the information available to Europol.

The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and analyses the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It does not seek to analyse the root causes of terrorism, neither does it attempt to assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures taken, although it can serve to illustrate some of these. The methodology for producing this annual report was developed by Europol and endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.

This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by Europol in consultation with the 2012 TE-SAT Advisory Board, composed of representatives of the past, present, and future EU Presidencies, i.e. Poland, Denmark and Cyprus (the EU 'Troika'), along with permanent members, representatives from France and Spain, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), Eurojust, the office of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator, and Europol staff.

The methodology and definitions used in this report are explained in Annex 5.

4. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU IN 2011

- 174 terrorist attacks in EU Member States
- 484 individuals arrested in the EU for terrorist related offences
- Lone actors were responsible for the killing of two persons in Germany, and 77 persons in Norway
- 316 individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorism charges

Not one religiously-inspired terrorist attack on EU territory was reported by Member States, nor were any single-issue terrorist attacks registered. The killing of two American military personnel at Frankfurt airport by a religiously-inspired individual in March 2011 is not a terrorist attack according to German legislation, although the incident clearly carried some such characteristics. Of all specified affiliations, the majority of attacks were committed by separatist groups.

4.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

The decline in the number of attacks in the EU continued in 2011 with a total of 174 attacks in seven Member States.¹ The majority of the reported terrorist attacks took place in France (85), Spain (47) and the United Kingdom (26). Spain saw the number of separatist attacks decrease by nearly 50% compared to 2010. A total of 484 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offences.²

Most arrests were reported by France (172), followed by the Republic of Ireland and Spain, with 69 and 64 arrests respectively.³ The number of arrests related to right- and left-wing violent extremism is still low compared to the arrests for offences related to separatist violent extremism and terrorism. The latter still represent the largest part of all arrests, although they have decreased from 412 in 2009 to 349 in 2010, and further to 247 in 2011.




Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks; number of arrested suspects, 2007 to 2011

1 For an overview of all attacks per Member State and per affiliation, see Annex 2.

2 For the UK, figures represent the number of charges for 2011, to provide a more accurate comparison with the number of judicial arrests in the other Member States. However, at this stage in the criminal justice process it is not possible for the UK to assign an affiliation to individual cases.

3 For an overview of all arrests per Member State and per affiliation, see Annex 3.

Compared to previous years, there were more arrests for the membership of a terrorist organisation, propaganda, possession of arms and explosives, and the dispatch of fighters to conflict. The number of arrests for most other offences, including the preparation of attacks, attempted attacks and completed attacks, has decreased.

4.2. LONE ACTORS

Serious threats emanate not only from established terrorist organisations but increasingly from lone actors⁴ and small groups in EU Member States, whose radicalisation takes place largely undetected. This development is facilitated by the Internet, and – in the religiously-inspired strand – is also incited by al-Qaeda core and its affiliates to compensate for diminished capabilities to direct operations. The practice of “individual jihad” was advocated by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) through its online magazine, Inspire, and in a video published by the organisation in June 2011. However, the incidents in Norway in July 2011 prove that attacks performed by individually-operating actors are not a practice limited to al-Qaeda inspired terrorism.

On 22 July 2011, the Norwegian national Anders Behring Breivik killed 8 people through the explosion of a car bomb (a ‘vehicle-borne improvised explosive device’ (VBIED)) in the government quarter of Oslo. He also randomly shot 69 predominantly young people at a youth camp on the island of Utøya. The perpetrator is considered to be a lone actor whose targets were the Norwegian political system, including the government and the Labour Party. Moreover, he issued a 1518-page long manifesto named “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence” on the Internet. The manifesto

reveals that he established his own ideology from various influences and without a clear affiliation, presenting himself as a “cultural conservative”. His ideology is assessed as opposing multiculturalism and more specifically Islamism.

The existence of a group of right-wing terrorists in Germany, connected to alleged politically-motivated murders committed between 2001 and 2007, is another example and an illustration of the fact that it is extremely difficult to detect terrorists operating individually or in small groups.

4.3. TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

Financing of terrorism

Terrorist organisations are highly pragmatic in their approach to financing their activities. Religious or political boundaries are easily ignored if they stand in the way of the acquisition of funds. By the same token, these organisations employ tried and trusted methods of fundraising, both licit and illicit, such as the collection of donations from sympathisers and extortion, next to exploring new technologies for the same purpose.

Hostage taking with ransom demands has evolved into a tried and trusted method, a highly lucrative option for terrorist entities. This method is employed in particular by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as was illustrated by the kidnapping in Algeria of an Italian woman in February 2011, and then of a Spanish male and female and another Italian woman, in October 2011. The kidnapping of hostages for ransom by terrorist factions is seen throughout Africa, from Niger to Kenya.

⁴ Lone actors refers to single terrorists operating in isolation from any other organisation or other associates. Solo terrorists refers to individuals executing acts of terrorism without others but who are actively supported and assisted by a wider terrorist organisation.

In EU Member States, the abuse of social benefits is used to fund terrorist activities. In more substantial terms, terrorist organisations also raise funds through multiple global criminal enterprises in and outside the EU. One example of the latter is the suspected involvement of the PKK in narcotics trafficking to fund and support terrorist activities.

The cause of Tamil independence is still alive in Europe. Intelligence suggests that its supporters in the EU remain engaged in extortion, human trafficking, skim-ming schemes and other crimes to raise money to fight for their cause.

The Internet is increasingly used for all purposes, both legal and illegal, including fundraising to finance terrorist activities. Fundraising via the Internet by self-radicalised terrorist supporters is becoming more prevalent.

Explosives

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by terrorists of various affiliations is of growing concern. The components required for the construction of IEDs are easy to procure, their production requires expertise that can be obtained through open source information, and the chemical precursors can be legally obtained in EU Member States. The use of commercial explosives, by contrast, continues to decrease, partly due to increased monitoring and control by law enforcement agencies.

IEDs are currently the main weapon of choice of ethno-nationalist terrorists in Spain, France and the UK for executing attacks. Both Northern Ireland and France witnessed terrorist attacks in 2011 in which these types of explosives were used.

In 2011, left-wing terrorist groups claimed responsibility for attacks in which explosives were sent in letters, targeting several public and private institutions and

companies in France, Greece, Germany, Italy and Switzerland. Several improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) were used in a coordinated action to target railway infrastructures in Germany in October 2011.

The Breivik case illustrates that precursor chemicals are easily obtainable for anyone capable of inventing a plausible reason to procure them. The man responsible for the death of 77 people had been able to procure several tonnes of ammonium nitrate-based fertiliser to produce his explosives, on the ostensible grounds that they were intended for agricultural use. The materials he used were shipped from EU Member States.

Animal rights violent extremists and related single-issue organisations are known to use both IEDs and IIDs.

Communication

Terrorist and violent extremist actors readily make use of Internet communication channels to exchange information they perceive as safe, secure and inconspicuous, and because they have no access to mainstream media. Consequently, for years the Internet has been firmly established as a facilitating factor for both terrorist and violent extremist organisations, and its use is growing as Internet availability extends worldwide.

Online social media sites attract high numbers of users. Internet forums are an effective means to address targeted audiences, including supporters who have no off-line links to terrorist organisations. Most forums restrict access, wholly or partially, to vetted members who need to prove their credentials and loyalty, or be recommended by established members before admission. Forum members are strongly advised by their moderators to use encryption software for direct communication.

Organisations use the Internet for a range of purposes, including instruction, the recruitment of supporters,

dispatch of members to conflict areas, fundraising, facilitating cooperation with other terrorist organisations, and the planning and coordination of attacks. Without the Internet, the audience reached would undoubtedly not be as wide. The Internet in particular continues to be used as an effective means of magnifying the propaganda efforts of violent extremist and terrorist groups.

A substantial proportion of terrorist propaganda on the Internet is distributed by a limited number of Internet forums. Some have thousands of members, many of whom will further distribute messages to other forums that have no apparent terrorist affiliation. In addition, individuals posing as media outlets edit, translate and publish terrorist content issued by foreign terrorist groups, and texts or multimedia content produced based on such material. Some terrorist organisations have designated particular forums or media outlets as their official communication channels.

The boundaries between virtual support networks, media outlets and terrorist organisations have become increasingly blurred. Members, even administrators, of terrorist and violent extremist forums can go on to undertake violent action, an evolution that is framed ideologically as a commendable development.

Additionally, the Internet enables individuals to undergo a process of radicalisation without necessarily being formally recruited, let alone controlled or guided by a terrorist organisation, which adds to the risk.

Apart from its use as a communication tool, the Internet offers new and additional possibilities to carry out terrorist attacks, such as electronic attacks on the operating systems of critical infrastructure in EU Member States, such as energy production facilities and transport. Attacks could create power outages, disrupt traffic or even destroy entire systems by taking over

controls remotely. The sophisticated computer virus called Stuxnet, supposedly designed to specifically target the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in Iran, discovered in 2011, illustrates the high potential of the use of the Internet with malicious intent. Leading members of al-Qaeda have already encouraged “electronic jihad” against critical infrastructure in Western countries. The potential threat of such terrorist action seems moderate or even high.

Cyberterrorism

There is a lack of international consensus concerning the term “cyberterrorism”, which is used variously to describe activities including electronic attacks on critical infrastructure, intellectual property theft relating to research and development, and even the use of Internet technology for the dissemination of propaganda or for communication purposes.

While the EU is yet to experience a systematic campaign of cyber attacks by established terrorist groups, a number of developments in recent years point to a convergence of social and technological factors which may well prove fertile ground for an increase in ideologically-motivated electronic attacks.

One of the challenges of investigating cybercrime is that in many cases the motivation for criminal activity becomes apparent only after further investigation. Often the methods and tools used in ideologically-motivated attacks are the same as in those that are profit driven. For example, botnets - networks of many thousands of compromised computers - may be used to distribute phishing emails with the intention of harvesting personal and financial data, to conduct automated intrusions, or to provide the necessary network traffic or bandwidth for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. These aim to saturate servers, websites and other networked services until they cease to function.

The EU has also witnessed the development of cyber-crime from a niche activity into a mature service industry. Criminal tools including botnets, complete crimeware toolkits and coding activity are retailed in the digital underground economy, often with limited knowledge of, or concern for, how these might be used. At the same time, the rise of hacktivism has introduced a new online model for distributed disorder, with cellular and lone actors operating under the banner of global brands, while using cybercriminal tools such as DDoS attacks to express anger or frustration, or as “punishment” for perceived wrongdoing.

In the context of electronic attacks, therefore, the distinction between organised crime and terrorism and/or violent extremism is increasingly blurred. The use of the same tools and methods for a range of criminal and political ends highlights the need not only for a continuing holistic response to electronic attacks, whatever their motivation, but also for greater collaboration between law enforcement and those responsible for protecting critical infrastructure to develop effective counter-measures.

4.4. CONVICTIONS AND PENALTIES⁵

In 2011, there were 153 **concluded** court proceedings involving terrorist charges reported in 12 Member States, which is an increase compared to 2009 and 2010.⁶ As in previous years, court cases concluded in 2011 relate mainly to events which occurred in the years before the timeframe of the TE-SAT 2012, some

	2009	2010	2011
Individuals tried	400	317	316

Figure 2: Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings involving terrorist charges in 2009, 2010 and 2011⁷

dating back to the 1980s. The concluded court proceedings in 2011 involved 316 individuals to whom a total of 346 verdicts were handed down. Some verdicts are pending judicial remedy. Out of the 316 individuals, 40 were female - a slight increase in comparison with 2010. The majority of the female defendants (33) were tried for separatist terrorism.

The highest number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2011 was again in Spain. Denmark, Germany and France saw an increase compared to 2010; Belgium and the Netherlands saw a decrease, whereas Italy and the United Kingdom have seen a continuous decrease in the past two years. In 2011, for the first time, Lithuania reported a terrorism-related court decision.

In Denmark, several trials took place in 2011 in relation to attacks targeting the Danish artist who caricatured the prophet Mohammed as well as the newspaper that published the caricatures. In February, one individual was found guilty of attempted terrorism for having tried to kill the artist. He was also found guilty of assaulting a policeman and of illegal possession of an axe and knife. He was permanently banned from entering Denmark after serving the sentence. In June,

⁵ Please refer to Annex 4 for additional information and clarification on the numbers mentioned in this section.

⁶ If verdicts in 2011 were appealed in the same year and came to a conclusion before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as one. In Spain, in cases when the 1st instance decision was appealed by some of the defendants and the appeal also took place in 2011, the proceedings were counted as two. Also, trials where an appeal is pending have been included in the reporting, but these judgments are not considered final. The data for Belgium includes a proceeding in which 3 members of the right-wing group “Blood & Honour” were tried for racism and xenophobia charges. The data confirmed by Ireland does not cover the whole 2011. The data received from the United Kingdom does not cover Northern Ireland.

⁷ Data received by the drafting team after the deadline for collecting information for the TE-SAT 2010 and 2011 could not be included in the respective reports.

a higher court confirmed the judgment and added one more year to the initial sentence of nine years. The case is due in the Supreme Court in 2012.

Also, in May 2011, one individual, prosecuted for an attempted attack against the Danish newspaper "*Morgenavisen Jyllandsposten*" by means of a home-made explosive device, was found guilty of attempted terrorism and illegal possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, with a permanent ban from entering Denmark after serving the sentence. The decision on the case is final.

As in 2009 and 2010, the majority of reported verdicts in 2011 relate to separatist terrorism. Spain has the most verdicts for separatist cases in 2011, as well as the highest number of verdicts for religiously-inspired terrorism. France saw the second highest number of verdicts handed down for separatist terrorism, and Germany and the United Kingdom had the next highest number of verdicts for religiously-inspired terrorism. Spain was the only EU Member State with court decisions on left-wing terrorism in 2011. The only right-wing case concluded in 2011 took place in Belgium.⁸

In 2011, five individuals were brought to court in the Netherlands for their links with the LTTE. The two main suspects were leading members of the *Tamil Coordinating Committee* (TCC) in the Netherlands and used the Tamil diaspora for fundraising. Both suspects were acquitted of membership of an organisation that had the objective of committing terrorist crimes, as the court decided that - in the relevant period between 10 August 2004 and 26 April 2010 - there was an armed conflict within Sri Lanka. On this basis, it could not be considered that the LTTE was an organisation with the objective of committing terrorist crimes. They were, however, convicted of membership of a criminal organisation. Three other

defendants were also found guilty. The court handed down sentences of between two and six years in prison.

In Germany, four individuals were charged with membership of a terrorist organisation and violation of German export laws. They were prosecuted for providing funds and weapons to support the armed struggle of the LTTE and convicted to prison terms of between nine months and four years, and between nine months and two years for violating German export laws.

The percentage of acquittals (31%) has increased in comparison with previous years (18% in 2009, 27% in 2010). Of the 40 female defendants, 18 were completely acquitted and one was acquitted in one proceeding and convicted in another.

Similar to 2009 and 2010, reported verdicts in relation to separatist terrorism in 2011 had the highest acquittal rate (34%), followed by left wing and religiously inspired terrorism-related proceedings, with acquittal rates of 27% and 24% respectively.

Six of the 12 countries with court decisions on terrorism cases in 2011 have a full conviction rate with no acquittals.⁹ France and the Republic of Ireland can be seen as having had mostly successful prosecutions.

The acquittal rate in Spain, which has the highest number of verdicts, continues to increase (21% in 2009, 38% in 2010, and 42% in 2011). As stated in last year's report, the level of acquittals in Spain can be explained by the characteristics of the Spanish judicial system, focused on prevention and protection. Often, Spain criminalises and prosecutes preparatory terrorist acts, such as recruitment and training activities. Also, conspiracy to commit terrorist activities or the support thereof is prosecuted to prevent acts from occurring.

⁸ See footnote 6.

⁹ These countries are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania and the Netherlands.

Member State	Average
Belgium	3
Denmark	6
France	10
Germany	4
Ireland (Republic of)	7
Italy	6
Lithuania	12
The Netherlands	4
Spain	14
United Kingdom	17

Figure 3: Average penalty per convicted individual (in years)¹⁰

As explained by the Spanish prosecution authorities, these offences are grounded in circumstantial evidence which is then assessed by the courts.

In a ruling from 2011, a former military chief of ETA was cleared by the *Audiencia Nacional* based on a lack of evidence linking him to the 2002 attempted assassination of a media group's executive. In the judgment it was ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution was "insufficient" to link the accused to the terrorist action. During the trial, the prosecution argued that intelligence experts revealed that the perpetrators of the attack were members of the 'K-Olaia command', the defendant allegedly being one of them. The evidence consisted, *inter alia*, of documents related to the planning of the attack, seized during a raid of ETA's

safe house in the French town of Tarbes in December 2002. Also, traces of biological remains were found in the residence of two ETA members, both convicted for the attack. The court concluded that the evidence effectively proved that the accused was in contact with the perpetrators of the attack; however, it did not demonstrate that he participated in the planning or execution, and thus the court acquitted him.

The average penalty imposed in 2011 in Europe for acts of terrorism is approximately eight years. As for the various types of terrorism in 2011, the average punishment for verdicts handed down for separatist and left wing terrorism amounts to 12 years, for religiously-inspired terrorism 7 years (the same as in 2010), and for right-wing, less than one year.¹¹ The highest average penalty is for the type "Not specified" due to life sentences given in France.¹²

In a UK trial, a former British Airways software engineer was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. His initial intention had been to go overseas to take part in "jihad" but, following contact with others, he decided to stay at BA and explore ways of getting explosives on board aircraft and disrupting international air travel by crashing the airline's computer systems. He was found guilty on four counts of engaging in conduct in preparation of terrorist acts. He pleaded guilty to further terrorism offences before the trial began, admitting he was involved with extremists who wanted to overthrow a foreign country's government, as well as to the possession of information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.

¹⁰ The average penalties do not include data from Greece. In Spain cumulative sentences of up to 1000 years were given for separatist terrorism offences. In the United Kingdom and France life sentences were imposed. For the purpose of the overview, sentences exceeding 40 years and life sentences have been counted as 40 years.

¹¹ See footnote 6.

¹² In some countries, suspended sentences have been imposed. These have been included in the figures above. In Germany, youth penalties, community service or probation were also given.

It should be noted that, aside from imprisonment, France often imposes a penalty of banishment from the national territory. Spain has a similar type of punishment, taking away civil rights from individuals. Also, in some cases a financial penalty was imposed.

5. RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED TERRORISM

- Violent jihadist terrorist groups provide indications of an increase in sophistication, but largely continue to exhibit poor skills and professional tradecraft, preventing them from committing effective attacks in the EU
- European home-grown groups are becoming less homogeneous in terms of ethnicity
- Political changes in Arab countries in 2011 did not lead to visibly increased activities by al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups in the EU
- The death of Osama bin Laden has had little impact on the overall threat from al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorism
- In 2011, no al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorist attacks were carried out in EU Member States
- Two US military personnel were killed in a religiously-inspired attack in Germany¹³
- The number of individuals arrested for offences related to violent jihadist terrorism dropped from 179 in 2010 to 122 in 2011




Figure 4: Number of individuals arrested for religiously inspired terrorist offences in Member States in 2011

5.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

The situation relating to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorism in EU Member States continues to be diverse. In 2011, religiously-inspired attack plots included al-Qaeda-directed groups, home-grown cells inspired by al-Qaeda and self-radicalised, self-directed lone actors. However, Member States have not reported a single al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorist attack actually carried out in 2011. The murder of two US military personnel by a lone actor in Germany in March 2011 is considered a religiously-inspired attack, whilst not judged

a terrorist act under German legal code. This incident emphasises both the existence and acute danger of home-grown extremism and the difficulty of monitoring lone actors.

As in recent years, the al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired threat towards Scandinavia and Germany rose steadily during 2011, whilst other Member States, such as France, Spain and the United Kingdom, remained constant targets and centres for radical activities. A number of Member States with a military presence in Afghanistan likewise experienced a persistent threat in various forms.

¹³ The killing of two American military personnel at Frankfurt airport by a religiously-inspired individual in March 2011 is not a terrorist attack according to German legislation, although the incident clearly carried some such characteristics.

In 2011, 122 persons were arrested in the EU for offences related to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorism. More than half of these persons were primarily arrested on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation, such as AQIM or al-Shabab. Seventeen persons were arrested for the preparation of a terrorist attack, a number significantly lower than in 2010, when there were an unprecedented 89 arrests for that reason. Other offences included, but were not limited to, propaganda (12), recruitment (7), financing of terrorist activities (13), the facilitation of terrorist offences (10), the possession of arms and explosives (4), or a combination of these and other offences.

Over the past three years, there has been a decrease in arrests for attacks and financing-related offences, but the percentage of arrests for recruitment and sending volunteers to be trained to fight in conflict zones such as the Afghanistan / Pakistan border area and Somalia has increased.

The average age of those arrested is 30 years. However, the individuals arrested for the preparation of attacks and sending volunteers are, in the majority of cases, younger than 25.

Arrests related to al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorism were reported by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.¹⁴

More than half of the arrested individuals were non-EU nationals. 14 per cent were of Moroccan nationality and 12 per cent were Russians. The number of individuals arrested with a Russian nationality increased from 3 in 2009, to 9 in 2010 and 16 in 2011. A number of these arrests are linked to a 2009 investigation into the preparation of an attack.

An increasing number of the arrested individuals are not linked to a known terrorist organisation; this may be an indication of an increase in autonomous violent jihadist cells and lone actors.

Home-grown religiously-inspired terrorist networks

Home-grown, religiously-inspired terrorist networks, particularly those augmented by individuals returning from violent jihadist training camps abroad, remain the principal concern of many Member States. Despite the death in 2011 of Osama bin Laden and other key al-Qaeda figures, home-grown al-Qaeda inspired individuals and groups based in Europe have continued to plan attacks directed against their countries of residence. The most significant attack plots in the EU during 2011 centred around home-grown groups based in Germany and the UK. Four persons arrested in Germany in April and December 2011 had established connections to al-Qaeda core and other al-Qaeda affiliates and it is believed that there were plans for at least one terrorist attack in Germany. The key figure in the cell had received terrorist training at camps in Pakistan. Twelve individuals from Birmingham, arrested in September and November 2011 in the UK, were charged with terrorism offences, including preparing for an act of terrorism in the UK, providing money for the purposes of terrorism, and failing to disclose information about potential acts of terrorism. This British-based home-grown group likewise demonstrated strong links to Pakistan. Other home-grown plots with less sophistication underline the potential of even simplistic attacks to impact upon the EU, as well as the unfaltering determination of home-grown violent jihadists to strike.

¹⁴ There have been arrests related to religiously-inspired terrorism in the UK, but they are not specified in the quantitative information received from the UK.

2011 has shown that European home-grown networks are becoming less homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. Instead, a common ideology provides the basis for the establishment of groups. In some instances, there are increasing contacts between individual networks within specific states. In other instances, however, home-grown networks remain small in number, loose in organisation and lack strong leadership and clear objectives. Some Member States have reported that home-grown groups and individuals are often focused upon violent jihad abroad rather than committing attacks in the West.

To some extent, European home-grown networks – particularly those whose members have not attended violent jihadist training camps – continue to exhibit poor professional tradecraft. In this regard, suspects engaged in attack planning and preparation have done so whilst maintaining an overtly high profile through open postings on new media channels or committing minor criminal acts of an extremist nature in tandem with their more clandestine activities. During 2011, a suspect resident in Germany sought to acquire components for home-made explosives (HMEs) despite having had his passport confiscated by German authorities in 2009 after being suspected of attempting to travel to a training camp.

Nevertheless, 2011 provided some indications of increasing sophistication amongst home-grown violent jihadists in some respects. Of note is an evolution in modus operandi towards the production of HMEs for use in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) incorporating components extracted from commercially available commodities. Also noteworthy is the ongoing interest in receiving flight training for terrorist purposes which, in one instance during 2011, involved the use of a virtual flight simulator as an alternative instructional tool.

There are also indications that home-grown violent

jihadists become more proficient at reaching conflict zones through reflecting upon their earlier errors. In this context, increased interest in travelling to Somalia via Kenya was noted in 2011. In previous years, most followers seeking to fight for al-Shabab tended to be of Somali origin. In 2011, however, al-Shabab attracted European violent jihadists from beyond the Somali diaspora. Some radicalised individuals have shown a preference for travelling to Somalia over Pakistan. However, this may be perceived by al-Qaeda inspired extremists as simply an easier route to violent jihad rather than a predilection for al-Shabab.

Despite their failure to commit any attacks during 2011, home-grown groups in the EU nevertheless continued to act as effective force multipliers for violent jihadist organisations overseas. Despite their relatively small size, violent jihadist groups located in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, such as the Deutsche Taliban Mudschahidin (DTM), interacted with EU home-grown networks to pursue attack plots and gain additional volunteers.

Solo terrorists and lone actors

As a consequence of sustained military pressure, al-Qaeda core have publicly discouraged sympathisers from travelling to conflict zones in order to join them. It has instead promoted the idea of individually planned and executed attacks in Western countries without the active assistance of any larger organisation.

An indication of a deliberate shift by al-Qaeda core towards formalising a strategy of individual violent jihad is seen through its media wing's June 2011 release of a video message entitled *You Are Held Responsible Only For Yourself*. In this video, Osama bin Laden's successor, Aiman al-Zawahiri, and senior al-Qaeda ideologues, defined, glorified and incited individual violent jihadist lone actor attacks in addition to providing religious justification for them. The video dis-

suades potential jihadists in the West from travelling to Afghanistan-Pakistan and instead encourages them to commit attacks in their countries of residence.

Attacks by apparent solo terrorists targeted Western interests outside Europe with differing degrees of success. Most notable was the Marrakech café bombing in Morocco of 28 April 2011, which killed eight French nationals, a Briton, a Dutchman, a Swiss and a Portuguese national. A solo terrorist firearms attack against the US embassy in Sarajevo in October 2011 was markedly less successful. Other efforts by radicalised individuals to commit lone attacks elsewhere were foiled before execution or were poorly executed resulting in rapid arrests.

As with home-grown networks, solo home-grown terrorists present larger terrorist structures with the ability to magnify their capabilities through offering to conduct attacks inside Western states in their name. A solo terrorist of Moroccan origin arrested in August 2011 sought to support al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in this manner by planning to poison the water supplies of tourist locations in Spain, in retaliation for the death of bin Laden.

Lone actor terrorist attacks, however, remain largely amateur in their planning and execution, and a low-occurrence phenomenon overall. The success of an individual violent jihad attack is likely to be dictated by a combination of skills and training, together with ease of access to both weaponry and the potential target. Thus far, individual jihadists have been incapable of reaching professional levels of planning and execution. Despite instructing aspiring terrorists on the need for methodical preparation, the impetuous and semi-spontaneous nature of many individual violent jihadists' planning activities suggests that al-Qaeda remains unable to instil discipline and restrain impulsive acts. Despite the promotion of good tradecraft and security measures by the online magazine, Inspire, the indiscretion and

conspicuousness of many lone actors when obtaining component elements for an attack indicates the shortcomings of al-Qaeda's individual jihad strategy. Moreover, through continued glorification of incompetent attackers, al-Qaeda has not encouraged scrutiny of failed attacks in order to avoid repeating earlier mistakes. Consequently, many individual violent jihad plots have failed or have not achieved their full potential.

5.2. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Logistics and facilitation

Home-grown networks or single persons in the EU continue to support a variety of violent jihadist groups elsewhere through providing funds or logistical assistance. Other home-grown networks directly engaged in attack planning have engaged the services of organised crime groups (OCGs) to assist their activities, such as in raising funds through common criminal acts. OCGs have at times been unaware of the terrorist intentions of those they support.

Religiously-inspired terrorism continues to exploit EU Member States in Eastern Europe for terrorism-related activities. Various religiously-inspired elements have attempted to establish connections with Eastern European OCGs involved in the trafficking of human beings and the production of forged identity documents. Other religiously-inspired terrorists have sought to enter the EU through this region, often by claiming refugee status. A small number of known terrorists were also able to capitalise on the refugee surge from North African states to the Italian island of Lampedusa as a consequence of the Arab Spring events. Whilst such infiltration is of concern, the principal threat remains that posed by home-grown religiously-inspired terrorism rather than the influx of foreign nationals.

Internet propaganda

The engagement of religiously-inspired violent extremists, often converts, in Internet activities to support vio-



lent jihad remains high. The publication of articles and videos on al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired Internet sites, glorifying attacks for the purposes of recruitment and fundraising for the organisations, remained a constant theme during 2011. Violent jihadist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), received support by EU nationals posting propaganda texts and videos on the Internet, to recruit suicide bombers and radicalise viewers.

The killing of radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki and online propagandist Samir Khan in Yemen in September 2011 had significant impact on the production of propaganda targeting audiences in Western countries. Al-Awlaki had been one of the most vocal proponents of violence in the name of religion for years, addressing his audiences in both English and Arabic. Samir Khan was the alleged editor of the English-language online propaganda magazine, *Inspire*. Since their deaths, no new issues of *Inspire* have been published. In the course of 2010 the magazine had become one of the principal terrorist propaganda tools published in a European language.

Before their deaths, four new issues of *Inspire* were published on the Internet in 2011. The magazine continued its editorial line of encouraging its readers to take part in armed action either on “open fronts” or in their home countries. At the same time, the magazine provided information on the handling of weapons and the production of improvised explosive devices. The

magazine also identified potential targets, in particular publicly known persons who have, at some point in time, been involved in controversy surrounding the religion of Islam.

5.3. TERRORIST SITUATION OUTSIDE THE EU

“Arab Spring” events in North African and Middle Eastern countries

The revolts in a number of Arab countries starting in late 2010, which resulted in the overturn of several authoritarian governments in the region, were a severe setback for terrorist propaganda by al-Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters of its ideology. The protest movements, most of which remained peaceful and secular in character, illustrated the limited impact of al-Qaeda rhetoric on ordinary Arabs, and resulted in violent jihadists being mere bystanders.

Weak governance in some Arab Spring states, together with the abundance of uncontrolled Libyan arms, in particular, remain causes for concern. Whilst al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates were notably absent from the protests, demonstrations and conflicts in early 2011, groups such as AQIM and the Nigerian Boko Haram had arguably enhanced their positions in some respects by the end of 2011. Both groups are likely to have used the Libyan conflict to secure unknown quantities of arms and ammunition from Libyan arsenals either for future operations or for onward sale to finance their activities.

Al-Qaeda affiliates beyond Europe

AQIM continues to pose a notable threat to France and Spain, in particular. Despite repeated threatening statements, the group has thus far failed to demonstrate any capacity to directly attack the European continent. It has instead sought to finance individual jihadists with personal connections in Europe who are willing to conduct attacks on its behalf. AQIM nevertheless carried out a number of kidnappings of West-

ern nationals in the Sahel and Maghreb regions in 2011. Other religiously-inspired terrorist groups and cells in the North African region remain intent on attacking European nationals, as evidenced by the aforementioned Marrakech café bombing in Morocco.

The death of AQAP's cleric and lead figure, Anwar al-Awlaki, killed by a drone on 30 September 2011, was a substantial blow to the organisation although it did not directly reduce its operational capabilities. The designer of the bomb packages intercepted on their way to the US in October 2010, and of the portable devices used in the attack on the Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayef and in the failed attempt to create an explosion on a flight between Amsterdam and Detroit in 2009, is still among AQAP's leaders.

Although al-Shabab has recently increased its appeal for European volunteers, the primary objective of the group is assessed to be the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia rather than planning attacks overseas. Nevertheless, individuals from the Somali diaspora in particular may be inspired to initiate attacks by the group's propaganda output.

Kidnappings

Western nationals travelling or working in Africa, the Middle East and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions are increasingly being targeted for kidnapping operations by al-Qaeda-inspired groups or other religiously-inspired terrorist organisations. Eight EU nationals remained hostages at the start of 2011. This figure was increased by at least a further 24 in 2011. It is assessed that the kidnapers primarily sought to secure financing for the terrorist groups concerned through ransom demands rather than securing political objectives.

2011 also saw an increase in the number of new religiously-inspired terrorist groups engaged in kidnap-



pings. Unknown groups, including Haraket al-Nahda wal-Islah (The Movement for Renewal and Reform) in Lebanon and the AQIM splinter group Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa) in the Sahel region, claimed responsibility for kidnapping EU nationals in 2011. A group of terrorists associated with Boko Haram kidnapped a British and an Italian engineer working for an Italian construction firm in Nigeria in May 2011.

The increasing number of groups issuing ransom demands is likely to result in increased competition and rivalry between different groups, particularly in Northern and Western Africa, where encroachment by kidnapers into the 'territory' of others may result in confrontation.

Opportunist organised crime groups in different regions continue to transfer kidnapped victims to religiously-inspired terrorist groups, most likely for financial gain. Other regional OCGs and extremist political groups may also seek to pose as violent jihadist groups, as additional leverage against government authorities. The case of seven Estonian tourists kidnapped by Haraket al-Nahda wal-Islah in Lebanon in March 2011 was not related to terrorism and was not politically motivated. The Estonian investigation identified that the hostage-takers' sole objective was to kidnap foreigners

for financial gain. The terrorist front group was created on an ad hoc basis for this specific operation. Similarly, kidnappings of westerners in the Horn of Africa have blurred the distinction between pure criminality and terrorism.

Death of Osama bin Laden

Whilst the death of Osama bin Laden is of undoubted importance, at least in symbolic terms, it has had little immediate impact on the al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorism threat in the EU. The many statements by violent jihadist groups and individuals threatening attacks to avenge his death did not translate into action in 2011. Nevertheless, EU Member States have been highlighted as desirable targets for terrorist attacks by al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda.

To a certain extent, bin Laden's significance in the leadership and direction of a global jihad against western powers had diminished in recent years and his death, almost 10 years after 9/11, has far less significance in 2011 than if it had occurred in the years immediately after the attack. The ability of al-Qaeda core in Pakistan to direct terrorist attacks abroad has likewise lessened in tandem with the isolation of the al-Qaeda hierarchy in the Pakistan region. Whilst bin Laden was arguably a figure of increasingly peripheral importance, the ongoing Arab Spring developments in the North African and Middle East region are currently more significant.

However, the legacy of bin Laden, in terms of radicalisation and inspiration, is enormous. In the ten years since 9/11, al-Qaeda has metamorphosed from a small group undertaking international plots into a concept of global jihad operated by home-grown groups or individuals without specific direction from bin Laden. His alliances with other jihadist groupings and the increasing concept of leaderless violent jihad are likely to be unaffected by his death.

6. ETHNO NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

- A significant decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in Spain
- 110 attacks carried out in EU Member States
- 247 individuals arrested for separatist terrorism-related offences in EU Member States
- EU Member States provide important logistical support bases for groups based outside the EU

6.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

In 2011, 110 attacks were claimed or attributed to separatist terrorist organisations in France and Spain, while 247 individuals were arrested for offences related to separatist terrorism in EU Member States.

The majority of the individuals were arrested in France (126), Republic of Ireland (68) and Spain (41).

2011 was characterised by a significant decrease in terrorist activities by ETA and its support groups, following the announcements made by ETA regarding the establishment of a ceasefire and, later, about the definitive cessation of its armed activity.

In 2011, ETA committed one terrorist attack in France (Valliere, Creuse). Two ETA members opened fire against the Gendarmerie while trying to escape from a police checkpoint. In this attack one person was injured.

Street violence carried out by ETA sympathisers also decreased significantly in 2011. Only 13 attacks were perpetrated in the Basque region and Navarre, mostly making use of home-made explosive and incendiary devices.¹⁵




Figure 5: Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for ethno nationalist and separatist terrorism in Member States in 2011

The extortion of entrepreneurs in the Basque region and Navarre (ETA's main sources of income) seems to have disappeared, following a decision taken by ETA in the context of the cease-fire announced in January 2011. However, ETA sympathisers reportedly carried out a "door-to-door" campaign at Christmas to collect funds from small shops and stores: a "volunteer" contribution was requested and the names of those who refused to contribute were recorded.¹⁶

¹⁵ Crónica (bulletin number 1560), Vasco Press, 9 January 2012.

¹⁶ Interior afirma que ETA recauda fondos para tener vivo su 'aparato logístico', El Mundo, 23 January 2012.

The dismantling of several ETA cells and the seizure of explosives in Spain, France and Portugal over the past few years have brought ETA to one of its weakest positions ever.

The most relevant communiqués issued in 2011 were published on 10 January and 20 October. In the first one, ETA announced a general and permanent ceasefire which could be verified by an “ad-hoc” international commission, in an attempt to involve the international community in the so-called Basque conflict. In its statement of 20 October (recorded in a video and distributed to two Basque newspapers, as well as to The New York Times and the BBC), ETA made public its decision to definitively cease its armed actions.

Although in 2011 ETA announced a permanent ceasefire and the end of its campaign to collect money via extortion, the recruitment of new members and the collection of information on new and future targets are still ongoing. ETA has not announced the surrender of its weaponry or the dissolution of the terrorist organisation.

Experience based on similar announcements made in the past may lead to the conclusion that ETA could resume its terrorist activities at any moment, if they fail to achieve their political goals: the establishment of a peace talk process with the Spanish and French governments to create an independent state, comprising the Spanish and French Basque regions plus Navarre. The appearance of splinter groups, comprising the most radical ETA members, who are against the cessation of terrorist activities, cannot be ruled out.

Police and judicial activity against ETA, at national and international level, continued in 2011, irrespective of the announcements made by the organisation. As a result, 55 persons were arrested for their membership, support or criminal/terrorist links to ETA.

The most relevant arrests were made in March in Vizcaya (Spain), when an operational commando was dismantled,¹⁷ and in April in Guipuzcoa (Spain), when a logistic cell in charge of producing, storing and distributing explosive materials was apprehended. This last operation confirms the trend that ETA has moved, or tried to move, its logistic bases from the south of France to the north of Spain (Basque region and Cataluña), as well as to Portugal.

The Galician pro-independence movement carried out 12 attacks in Galicia. Four attacks can be attributed with certainty to Resistencia Galega (RG), while the remaining eight were perpetrated by persons or small groups ideologically involved in the so-called radical pro-independence fight.

In October, RG published a communiqué on the Internet claiming responsibility for several attacks carried out against political parties, real estate and construction companies, banks, etc., and announced the continuation of its terrorist activities by increasing its armed attacks.

In November and December, a total of six RG members were arrested in Spain. After searching several houses, police seized home-made explosive devices. Allegedly, RG had planned coordinated attacks to be perpetrated on the anniversary of the approval of the Spanish Constitution.

¹⁷ The operational commando, made up of four terrorists, was inactive between 2006 and 2009, and is thought to be responsible for, at least, two casualties.

Dissident republican (DR) terrorist groups (Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), Oglagh na hEireann (ONH) and others) remain the most significant threat to national security in Northern Ireland and, over the past two years, DR groups have demonstrated the capability to carry out a range of IED and shooting attacks against security forces and other targets. Most DR groups are heavily involved in criminal activities such as robberies, extortion, tobacco and fuel smuggling and paramilitary assaults within their own community.

The murder of a Catholic police constable in April 2011 in the UK was the first fatal attack by dissident republicans since 2009. Police staff remained the principal target of dissident republicans, although attacks on premises in public areas, notably high street banks and the Londonderry City of Culture office, risked civilian casualties.

The CIRA, which is undergoing a period of internal turmoil, does not appear to have developed the same level of consistency in its capabilities as RIRA. The CIRA is currently undergoing organisational restructuring but the effective takeover of the CIRA by a potentially more radical internal element remains a cause for concern.

The RIRA's continued success in terms of deployment of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) across a wide range of targets in Northern Ireland is also a cause for concern. It is evident that, in the past two years, RIRA has improved its engineering and technical capabilities.

In France, 62 completed attacks and 13 attempted attacks were reported. All these attacks were carried out by Corsican terrorist groups. Their main target remains the tourism sector. Holiday homes and restaurants are often targeted.

Although the number of individuals arrested linked to the PKK is decreasing, Europe remains a logistical support base for funding, recruitment, training and propaganda. To fulfil these logistical activities, the PKK has a network of recruiters across Europe, which could be a cause of concern.

In 2011, individuals were arrested for membership of the PKK or criminal support activities to the PKK in France, Germany and Romania.

The majority of the suspects arrested were involved in fundraising for guerrilla operations in Turkey and for the maintenance of guerrilla camps in northern Iraq. Some of the funds collected are believed to be used to sponsor EU-based propaganda centres and training camps.

Extortion, money laundering, facilitating illegal immigration, drugs and human trafficking remain the main crimes committed by PKK members in Europe as well as their main profit generators.

The PKK committed several terrorist attacks on Turkish territory in 2011; however, the total number of attacks committed on Turkish soil has decreased.

The tactics used to commit attacks are mainly unchanged. Use of booby-trapped improvised devices and numbers of coordinated armed attacks carried out against the military, security services and border police posts have occurred in predominantly Kurdish areas of South-East Turkey.

However some changes in modus operandi have been observed, for example through the kidnapping of teachers, targeting of schools and hijacking of public transport.

In the rest of the world, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) did not carry out any attacks; no individuals were arrested in the Member States in 2011. However, LTTE was re-listed as a terrorist entity by the EU in July 2011 and the organisation is still considered active in some EU States.

Currently, the LTTE is assessed to have split into 'peaceful' factions that advocate the use of political means, and 'active militant' factions advocating violence to achieve their aims.

The militant factions of the LTTE are actively looking for support for their cause in terms of financing, logistics and propaganda in Member States with a large Tamil diaspora. These militant factions are suspected of using extortion, running illegal lotteries and human trafficking to collect funds, and of spreading propaganda on radio and TV stations and via numerous websites. Many of these activities have been carried out by various front organisations.

In general, the threat posed by the LTTE is considered low and attacks by the LTTE in the EU are unlikely. There is a risk, however, that inter-ethnic (Tamil) conflicts could sometimes erupt into violence.

7. LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

- 37 terrorist attacks carried out in EU Member States
- 42 individuals arrested in EU Member States
- Increased cooperation between environmental and left-wing violent extremist and terrorist groups

7.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

In 2011, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain reported a total of 37 terrorist attacks by left-wing and anarchist groups. This number represents a decrease compared to 2010, when 45 attacks were reported. The majority of incidents were arson attacks and mainly targeted government and businesses. The number of bomb attacks decreased from 23 in 2010 to 11 in 2011. While in 2010 attacks by left-wing and anarchist groups claimed the lives of six people, in 2011 one person in Greece lost his life during the construction of an improvised explosive device (IED) in the basement of a building. In Italy, two people were injured in separate attacks during the year.

A total of 42 persons were arrested in 2011 for left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences in 5 EU Member States: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain. As in 2010, when 34 arrested suspects were reported, most of the arrests occurred in Greece, Italy and Spain. The majority of those arrested were suspected of membership of a terrorist organisation.

The Italian anarchist group FAI (*Federazione Anarchica Informale*) claimed responsibility for a number attacks in Italy, Greece, Germany and Switzerland in 2011. For years, the group's modus operandi has been the coordinated delivery of IEDs by mail or the placing of several IEDs with different targets on the same date.

In two separate campaigns, one in March and another one in December 2011, parcel bombs were sent to a




Figure 6: Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for left-wing and anarchist terrorism in Member States in 2011

military barracks and a tax collection company in Italy, a prison in Greece, the headquarters of a bank in Germany, the Greek Embassy in France, and the offices of the Nuclear Industry Federation in Switzerland. The devices in Germany and Greece were intercepted before they exploded, but in the other instances three people were injured.

Similar to 2010, when 12 suspected members of the terrorist organisation *Synomosia Pyniron Fotias* were arrested, continued efforts by law enforcement authorities in Greece in 2011 resulted in additional arrests and seizures of large quantities of weapons. The number of terrorist attacks by left-wing and anarchist groups in Greece decreased from 20 in 2010 to six in 2011.

In April 2011, law enforcement authorities in Denmark arrested five persons held responsible for a number of

arson attacks targeting police buildings, a bank and the Greek Embassy in Copenhagen.

Violent extremist anarchists committed 20 attacks in 2011 in Spain, where the number of arrests has continued to decrease since 2007. In 2011, two violent extremist anarchists were arrested in Spain. A further three arrests were carried out in the framework of international cooperation to fight terrorism.

7.2. TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

While the use of incendiary devices by left-wing or violent anarchist extremists is not new, the targeting of specific weak points of the railway infrastructure is notable. Throughout 2011, left-wing/anarchist extremists targeted rail facilities in Germany, Italy and Finland. Between 10 and 13 October 2011, a total of 18 improvised incendiary devices were discovered at nine railway locations in Germany. The attacks were claimed by a previously unknown group. The group justified the placement of the devices as a direct response to German military deployment in Afghanistan and the fact that the German railway system provides logistical support for the German army.

Attacks linked to Greek or Italian anarchist circles occur frequently in Europe. In most cases, the motivation is an expression of solidarity with imprisoned anarchists. Similar to 2010, signs of increased transnational coordination between groups were observed in 2011. Communiqués issued by the Greek terrorist organisation *Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias* advocated the need to establish “an international network of anarchist individuals and groups”. The renewed activism of the FAI can be seen in this context. In documents found inside their parcel bombs, reference is made to the call by *Synomosia Pyrinon Fotias*.

The number of incidents related to the so-called “No Border” campaign is relatively high in comparison to



other ideological themes of left-wing/anarchist activism in the Netherlands. Also, in France, a number of incidents were motivated by the expulsion of asylum seekers. Besides the traditional meetings and protest demonstrations, a number of violent incidents, such as arson attacks, clashes with police and criminal damage, occurred in 2011. A significant incident in the Netherlands was a home visit - a tactic frequently used by violent animal rights extremists - damaging the house of the CEO of a construction company. Companies involved in the construction of detention centres for asylum seekers or prisons are preferred targets of anarchist extremists.

Confrontations between anti-fascist groups and their right-wing opponents have hardened and become increasingly violent in recent years.

While criminal offences in this context in Germany are predominantly committed in the context of right-wing meetings and parades, activists in the Czech Republic focus increasingly on attacking individuals. In Sweden, actions have focused on representatives of the Sweden Democrats party. In 2011, a number of local and regional party representatives received harassing emails and home visits.

A shift in direction in some anarchist protests towards environmental issues was already identified in 2010 in the UK. In 2011, anarchists joined the ranks of protesters in France and Italy during demonstrations against the construction of the future airport of Notre Dame des Landes in Nantes, and the high-speed railway line linking France and Italy in Val di Susa.

8. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

- The threat from right-wing terrorism and violent extremism comes from undetected lone actors or small groups rather than established extreme right-wing groups
- One right-wing terrorist attack in EU Member States
- Five individuals arrested for right-wing terrorism in EU Member States

8.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

One right-wing terrorist attack was reported by Spain in 2011. On 2 November, an arson attack was committed in Terrassa (Barcelona) on the facilities of a publishing company and an anti-capitalist cooperative society. The incident did not cause any casualties or fatalities.

Five persons were arrested for being involved in right-wing terrorism. All arrests took place in Germany and were linked to the right-wing extremist/terrorist group called “*Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund – NSU*” (National Socialist Underground), connected to alleged politically-motivated murders committed between 2001 and 2007.

The group is suspected of being responsible for the murders of nine people of Turkish and Greek origin, as well as for the shooting of a German police woman and the attempted murder of a male German police officer. The politically-motivated and xenophobic background was revealed from pieces of evidence seized after two of the NSU members committed suicide in early November 2011, having being pursued by the police following a bank robbery. Apart from this, the two male suspects are believed to be connected to a series of bank robberies which they used to finance their operations and their undercover lives. Moreover, the suspects are allegedly involved in two explosive attacks in

Cologne in 2001 and 2004. These attacks injured more than 30 people, most of them foreigners.

8.2. VIOLENT RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

During 2011, several Member States reported activities by violent right-wing extremist groups. The perception of these incidents among the public is shaped in particular by xenophobic (violent) offences, and right-wing parades often referring to public occasions or commemorations. Violent attacks appear to be, in most cases, the result of an accidental encounter or a reciprocal provocation.

In September 2011, Bulgaria experienced heavy unrest after the van of a Roma family ran over and killed a 19-year-old man. An angry crowd of about 2000 people gathered and attacked three houses owned by the Roma leader in the village, shouting anti-Roma slogans. Further violent demonstrations by nationalist youths gradually spread to other towns. A total of 127 persons were arrested during the escalations. The violence was thought to be the worst since 1997, when an economic crisis and hyperinflation brought Bulgarian citizens to the streets.

The Czech Republic has also experienced rising tensions against the ethnic minority of Roma people. The escalations started after a group of Roma attacked an individual with a machete last summer in a bar close to the town of Varnsdorf in Bohemia. The Czech ‘Workers Party of Social Justice’ - *Delnická Strana Sociální Spravedlnosti* (DSSS) - seems to have taken advantage of this situation and mobilised their regional work by establishing local and regional affiliated organisations, as well as organising frequent anti-Roma protest marches in several towns.

Growing concerns over austerity programmes due to



the economic crisis, immigration and multiculturalism issues, combined with disillusion with mainstream politics, may lead to an increase in violent right-wing activities.¹⁸

Suggestions made in open sources that the attacks in Norway in July 2011 were acts of right-wing terrorism, or had links with right-wing extremist groups in the EU, have not been substantiated.

International links exist within the violent extreme right-wing scene, but they vary significantly in strength. Major public events, such as days of honour, annual commemoration marches, demonstrations or music concerts, play a key role in establishing contacts.

Propaganda and recruitment

Recruitment and the distribution of violent extreme right-wing propaganda are major causes of concern. Several Member States carried out investigations on this matter.

The Internet, and in particular social network platforms where White Power Music (WPM) is promoted, is a cause of concern.

In regard to this, the Swedish authorities reported that their WPM movement engages in a series of activities covering many aspects of the activists' lives. Most of their projects are of a social nature and aim to influence public opinion. Portuguese authorities reported that their right-wing scene, which has to compensate

for the conviction and imprisonment of important representatives of the 'Portuguese Hammerskins' (PHS), is trying to recover its strength through the right-wing music scene and close cooperation with other groups in Europe. In doing so, an international meeting called "White Christmas" was organised for the PHS on the outskirts of Lisbon on 3 December 2011.

Acquisition of weapons, ammunition and/or explosives

Several Member States confirmed that members of the extreme right-wing scene have access to and/or harbour ambitions to acquire weapons, ammunition and/or explosives, both legally and illegally. In particular, the ideological orientation on historical National Socialism, combined with an appreciation of the virtue of discipline, often goes along with an affinity for weapons and arms. This explains the fact that legal possession of (fire)arms is relatively common among violent right-wing extremists.

Whilst the seizure of illegal weapons and ammunition, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or materials used for the production of IEDs, may be an indication of a certain level of militancy for at least some parts of the scene, police authorities say that this phenomenon often relates more to the aspect of their subculture, than to an intention to use these weapons for terrorist ends. Nonetheless, it should be taken into account that these illegal weapons might be used in sporadic incidents to cause significant harm.

As in previous years, several arrested right-wing violent extremists were acting alone. These individuals might share an ideological identification with a violent extremist organisation, but do not necessarily communicate with the organisation with which they identify themselves.

¹⁸ "Far Right on Rise in Europe". www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/06/far-right-europe-report.

9. SINGLE-ISSUE TERRORISM

- **Increased activity by violent animal rights extremist groups have a significant impact on the businesses involved**
- **Violent single-issue extremist groups focus on a broad range of targets, including indirectly related institutions and businesses**
- **Increased cross-border cooperation between several types of violent extremist groups is a cause for concern**

No single-issue terrorist attacks or arrests were reported by Member States in 2011. Nevertheless, a number of incidents were reported by France, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and the Republic of Ireland and additional monitoring of open sources shows that a large number of incidents are never reported to the police. These activities carried out by violent animal rights extremists (ARE) and violent environmental extremist groups range from fairly low-level vandalism incidents to significant acts of destruction and the use of incendiary or improvised explosive devices.

Despite the low number of major incidents, the groups' activities remain a cause for concern. Incidents result in damage worth millions of Euros to the companies and institutions involved. Single individuals linked to these companies, or sometimes even random people, are targeted as victims.

Although there is no prototype of single-issue violent extremist groups or actors, some broad characteristics apply. The majority are relatively young and can be found in the group of idealistic, often relatively deprived, youngsters who do not agree with some movements in society and therefore seek to achieve their goals through violent action. These groups tend

to have similarities with violent left-wing extremist groups, which could be an explanation for the increased cooperation between violent left-wing and violent environmental extremist groups.

These groups will continue to attract radical individuals who are ready to use violent tactics. Professionalism and the often high competencies and capabilities of the group members, such as the effective use of the Internet for recruitment and propaganda, increase the threat posed by these groups.

9.1. SINGLE-ISSUE TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

Animal rights violent extremism

It is difficult to estimate the total number of Animal rights violent extremism (ARE) incidents carried out, because of Member States' tendency to focus only on major incidents in their reporting. The pharmaceutical industry reported 262 incidents worldwide in 2011.¹⁹ Although the majority of these incidents are demonstrations with a small number of persons involved, they have a serious impact on these businesses. In addition, they are the main propaganda tool for violent ARE groups. The pharmaceutical industries and research laboratories associated with medical schools and clinics which test food, cosmetics, and medicines on animals, are the favoured target of violent ARE groups. Related businesses, such as the financial institutions financing this research, are also becoming a target for these groups.

An airline company transporting animals to different laboratories throughout the world was also targeted by demonstrations; an airline-sponsored golf green was destroyed.

¹⁹ European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, EFPIA.



Although the majority of ARE activities are low-scale incidents, an increasing number of Member States report an intensification of violent extremist activities. Some of these incidents involve incendiary or improvised explosive devices, assaults on persons or hoax bomb telephone calls. Groups such as Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), Militant Forces against Huntingdon Life Sciences (MFAH) and National Anti-Vivisection Alliance (NAVA), have been involved in assaults on pharmaceutical company personnel and have targeted businesses related to the animal testing sector with improvised explosive devices.

Violent extremist incidents are also related to the meat, fish and poultry industry, including fast food restaurants and even butchers. In Italy, offices of the Food Science Department of the University of Bologna were set on fire and Animal Liberation Front activists set fire to a fast food restaurant. The fur and leather industry is another target. In 2011, there were some minor incidents: fur shop owners were threatened and fur coats were sprayed with paint. Incidents also related to other activities involving animals, such as hunting shops, circuses and kennels.

Propaganda on the Internet is one of the main tools of violent ARE groups. Most of their actions are published and claimed via their websites. The professional management of these websites gives the impression that some ARE groups are supported by a large group and that their announced activities might have a serious

impact if carried out. Additionally, they seek support via their websites and social networks through disinformation campaigns. In one case, an ARE group illegally entered multiple pig and rabbit farms. The footage they shot inside these farms was published later to show the alleged malpractices taking place in these farms.

Future changes in legislation regarding animal rights in the Member States may trigger new and increased actions by violent ARE groups.

Violent environmental extremist groups focus on targets accused of polluting the environment in a broad sense, such as construction companies, the energy and transport sectors, nuclear power and nano-technology. The number of incidents remains limited in the EU.

In France, demonstrations against the construction of two new airports escalated and resulted in eight casualties among law enforcement officers. There were also protests against the construction of high-speed rail connections between France and Italy.

The use of nuclear power remains a focal issue for environmental extremist groups. Traditional actions against radioactive waste transport between Member States continue.

Gene and nano-technology research is a recent target for violent environmental extremist groups. Further developments in these sectors could lead to an increase in violent activities against them.

Joint transnational protests and actions by violent left-wing extremist and violent environmental extremist groups could be an indication of stronger ties and increased cooperation between these groups. The future threat of violent environmental extremism might be influenced by cooperation with other violent extremist groups.

10. TRENDS AND FUTURE

OUTLOOK

The outstanding feature identified in this report is the **wide diversity of threats posed by terrorist and violent extremist groups** to EU Member States.

The efforts of al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorists are likely to remain concentrated on attacking their long-standing targets in EU Member States and may seek to capitalise on major events such as the **London Olympics** to maximise their impact. Violent extremist groups are targeting a broad range of sectors and increasing their influence via social media and the Internet.

There is no single factor that explains **radicalisation**, nor is there any agreed method to discover if a radicalised individual might commit violence. But, radicalisation that can lead to terrorism and violent extremism is often found among the most vulnerable individuals in society.

Violent extremist groups make use of social tensions to increase this radicalisation via their propaganda and recruitment practices.

Al-Qaeda core will remain a **key player** in the field of religiously-inspired terrorism. It will seek to further determine the agenda of associated groups but will also try to influence the thinking of vulnerable groups and individuals.

Religiously-inspired terrorism will continue to be largely driven and sustained by **geo-political developments** and changes in the Middle East, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa.

It is likely that attacks from violent jihadist **home grown and independent cells** will surpass the threat of the structured groups such as AQIM and AQAP directly linked to al-Qaeda.

Returning jihadists from conflict zones continue to pose a threat to the EU Member States. These individuals not only have the intention, but also the increased knowledge, to prepare attacks.


The connections between terrorist, violent extremist and organised crime networks may become more blurred. Terrorist and violent extremist activities are often financed through crime or organised crime activities. In some cases the same individuals who are engaged in terrorism or violent extremism are also involved in organised crime activities.

The further **globalisation of communication** increases the influence that terrorist and violent extremist groups have on their communities and followers. Through radicalisation and mobilisation in the real and virtual worlds, these groups will seek even more advocacy, support and participation at political, diplomatic and military levels.

The different *modi operandi* used in the violent extremist incidents in Norway in July 2011, as well as the investigation of the "National Socialist Underground" group in Germany, have demonstrated the devastating effect of **firearms**. Since the Mumbai attacks of 2008, the potential impact of a **successful firearms assault** has been obvious and may be chosen by future attackers.

The increasing sensitivity in society to environmental issues may lead to an **increase in violent actions by single-issue violent extremist** groups.

11. ANNEXES



ANNEX 1: ACRONYMS AND TRANSLATIONS

ALF	Animal Liberation Front
ANV	Acción Nacionalista Vasca Basque Nationalist Action
AQAP	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Tanzim qa'idat al-jihad fi jazirat al-'arab
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Tanzim al-qa'ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami
ARE	Animal rights extremism
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DSSS	Delnická Strana Sociální Spravedlnosti Workers Party of Social Justice
DTM	Deutsche Taliban Mudschahidin
ETA	Euskadi ta Askatasuna Basque Fatherland and Liberty
EU	European Union
FAI	Federazione Anarchica Informale Informal Anarchist Federation
HME	Home-made explosives
IED	Improvised explosive device
IID	Improvised incendiary device
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
INTCEN	EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (formerly the European Union Situation Centre (SITCEN))
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MFAH	Militant Forces Against Huntingdon Life Sciences
NAVA	National Anti-Vivisection Alliance
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NSU	Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund National Socialist Underground
OCG	Organised crime group
ONH	Oglaigh na hEireann (dissident republican paramilitary group split from CIRA)

PHS	Portuguese Hammerskins
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan Kurdistan Workers' Party
RG	Resistencia Galega Galician Resistance
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
SHAC	Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
Synomosia Pysinon Fotias Athina-Thessaloniki	Conspiracy of Fire Cells Athens-Thessalonica
TCC	Tamil Coordinating Committee
TE-SAT	European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TWP	Working Party on Terrorism of the Council of the EU
VBIED	Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
WPM	White power music

ANNEX 2: FAILED, FOILED AND COMPLETED ATTACKS IN 2011 PER MEMBER STATE AND PER AFFILIATION²⁰

Member State	Religiously- inspired	Separatist	Left- wing	Right- wing	Single- issue	Not specified	Total 2011
Denmark	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
France	0	85	0	0	0	0	85
Germany	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Greece	0	0	6	0	0	0	6
Italy	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Spain	0	25	21	1	0	0	47
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	26	26
Total	0	110	37	1	0	26	174

²⁰ In 2011, Northern Ireland experienced 26 involved attacks on national security targets - there were no other attacks on national security targets in the UK in 2011. Attacks on national security include those targeting principally (but not exclusively) the security forces, those who support them and premises and institutions associated with policing, justice and security.

ANNEX 3: ARRESTS IN 2011 PER MEMBER STATE AND PER AFFILIATION²¹

Member State	Religiously-inspired	Separatist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Single-issue	Not specified	Total 2011
Austria	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Belgium	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
Bulgaria	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Czech Republic	8	0	0	0	0	0	8
Denmark	0	0	5	0	0	2	7
Finland	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
France	46	126	0	0	0	0	172
Germany	19	4	2	5	0	0	30
Greece	0	0	15	0	0	0	15
Ireland (Rep. of)	1	68	0	0	0	0	69
Italy	13	0	14	0	0	3	30
The Netherlands	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Portugal	0	2	0	0	0	1	3
Romania	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
Slovakia	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Spain	17	41	6	0	0	0	64
Sweden	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	62	62
Total	122	247	42	5	0	68	484

²¹ For the UK the figures represent the number of charges for 2011, to provide a more accurate comparison with the number of judicial arrests in the other Member States. However, at this stage in the criminal justice process, it is not possible for the UK to assign an affiliation to individual cases.

ANNEX 4: DATA CONVICTIONS AND PENALTIES (EUROJUST)

Member State	2009	2010	2011
Austria	2	0	0
Belgium	7	10	8
Denmark	10	1	4
France	75	39	45
Germany	7	12	17
Greece	3	11	3
Ireland (Republic of)	15	18	11
Italy	24	22	4
Lithuania	0	0	1
The Netherlands	2	8	5
Spain	217	173	203
Sweden	1	4	2
United Kingdom	37	19	13
Total	400	317	316

4.1. Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorism charges per Member State in 2009, 2010 and 2011²²

²² Data received by the drafting team after the deadline for collecting information for the TE-SAT 2010 and 2011 could not be included in the respective reports. In 2011 the data for Belgium includes a proceeding in which three members of the right-wing group "Blood & Honour" were tried for racism and xenophobia charges. The data confirmed by Republic of Ireland does not cover the whole of 2011. The data for the UK does not cover Northern Ireland. In Republic of Ireland, two individuals were brought to court for whom a nolle was later entered. In the UK, one individual pleaded guilty but passed away before the court pronounced its decision. These three are included in the number of individuals in concluded court proceedings in 2011 but not in the number of verdicts. According to the information provided by national authorities, in 2011 a number of individuals appeared in more than one different court proceeding: one person appeared in five different court proceedings, two persons appeared in four different court proceedings, five appeared in three different court proceedings, and 13 appeared in two different court proceedings. One of these individuals was tried in France and all the others in Spain. The verdicts pronounced in the different proceedings were counted separately when analysing the number of verdicts by country, type of terrorism and severity of penalties.

Member State	Religiously- inspired	Separatist	Left- wing	Right- wing	Single- issue	Not specified	Total
Belgium	4	1	0	3	0	0	8
Denmark	2	0	0	0	0	2	4
France	9	33	0	0	0	4	46
Germany	12	5	0	0	0	0	17
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Ireland (Republic of)	0	4	0	0	0	5	9
Italy	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
Lithuania	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
The Netherlands	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Spain	14	210	11	0	0	0	235
Sweden	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
United Kingdom	12	0	0	0	0	0	12
Total	59	259	11	3	0	14	346

4.2. Number of convictions/acquittals for terrorism charges in 2011, per Member State and per affiliation²³

²³ The numbers do not include the two individuals in Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the UK.

Member State	Convicted	Acquitted	Total verdicts	Acquitted %
Belgium	8	0	8	0%
Denmark	4	0	4	0%
France	45	1	46	2%
Germany	17	0	17	0%
Greece	2	1	3	33%
Ireland (Republic of)	8	1	9	11%
Italy	4	0	4	0%
Lithuania	1	0	1	0%
The Netherlands	5	0	5	0%
Spain	137	98	235	42%
Sweden		2	2	100%
United Kingdom	8	4	12	33%
Total	239	107	346	31%

4.3. Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per Member State in 2011²⁴

²⁴ The numbers do not include the two individuals in the Republic of Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the United Kingdom.

Member State	Final	Pending judicial remedy	Total
Belgium	5	3	8
Denmark	3	1	4
France	35	11	46
Germany	14	3	17
Greece	0	3	3
Ireland (Republic of)	0	9	9
Italy	0	4	4
Lithuania	0	1	1
The Netherlands	0	5	5
Spain	137	98	235
Sweden	2	0	2
United Kingdom	12	0	12
Total	208	138	346

4.4. Number of final and not final verdicts per Member State in 2011²⁵

²⁵ The numbers do not include the two individuals in Ireland for whom a nolle was entered or the deceased defendant in the United Kingdom

ANNEX 5: METHODOLOGY

For the preparation of this report, Europol collected qualitative and quantitative data on terrorist offences in the EU and data on arrests of people on suspicion of involvement in those offences, provided or confirmed by Member States. Similar data were collected, when available, of offences in which EU interests were affected outside of the EU. Eurojust has contributed data on convictions and penalties for terrorist offences in EU Member States. In addition, open source information gathered by Europol was used for the production of this report.

Included as 'arrests' are those judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by national law. The fact that the person may subsequently be provisionally released or placed under house arrest does not impact on the calculation of the number of arrests.

The definition of the term 'terrorist offences' is indicated in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA),²⁶ which all Member States have implemented in their national legislation. This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of:

- seriously intimidating a population, or
- unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act, or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

In cases in which the wording of Article 1 of the Framework Decision leaves room for interpretation, the TE-SAT 2012 respects Member States' definitions of terrorist offences on their territories. At times, it can be difficult to assess whether a criminal event is to be regarded as an act of 'terrorism' or as an act of 'extremism'. Contrary to terrorism, not all forms of extremism sanction the use of violence. Nevertheless, extremism as a phenomenon may be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural patterns. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2012 mentions criminal acts with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country, when they were reported by the Member States as extremism, in an effort to provide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and its relation to terrorism. However, these cases were not considered in the statistical data of this report, which exclusively reflect incidents reported as terrorism by EU Member States.

Types of terrorism

The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their source of motivation. However, many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates. The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU, as reported by Member States. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Religiously-inspired terrorism is perpetrated by individuals, groups, networks or organisations that evoke religion to justify their actions. Al-Qaeda inspired or affiliated groups belong to this group.

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.

²⁶ Amended by the Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008.

Left-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire political, social and economic system of a state according to an extremist leftist model. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist groups is usually revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. Not all Member States distinguish between activities of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their contributions. For this reason, both categories are discussed in the same chapter of this report.

Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist right-wing model. The ideological roots of European right-wing extremism and terrorism can usually be traced back to National Socialism.

Single-issue terrorism is violence committed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within a target society. The term is generally used to describe animal rights and environmental terrorist groups.

Data collection

The EU Council Decision on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences of 20 September 2005 (2005/671/JHA) obliges Member States to collect all relevant information concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences, and sets out the conditions under which this information should be sent to Europol. Europol processed the data and the results were cross-checked with the Member States and, in case of divergences or gaps, corrected and complemented, and then validated by the Member States.

Eurojust also collected data on the basis of the aforementioned EU Council Decision, according to which the Member States are equally obliged to collect all relevant information concerning prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences and send the data to Eurojust. Eurojust cross-checked the collected data with the Member States and, in case of divergences or gaps, this data was also corrected, complemented and then validated. If convictions that took place in 2011 were appealed but came to a conclusion before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceedings as one. The arrests and convictions may be related to terrorist offences that took place before 2011 and, consequently, may not be related to activities and attacks referred to in the TE-SAT 2012.

ANNEX 6: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU FRAMEWORK DECISION ON COMBATING TERRORISM IN THE EU MEMBER STATES – CHANGES IN MEMBER STATES DURING 2011

Austria

In Austria a provision concerning training for terrorism was included in the Criminal Code (§ 278e), which has been in force since 1 January 2011.

With the Federal Law Gazette No. 103/2011, published on 21.11.2011 (BGBl. 103/2011), §§ 278f and 282a were included in the Austrian Criminal Code implementing Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. According to § 278f it is punishable to provide instructions to commit a terrorist offence; § 282a punishes the public provocation to commit a terrorist offence and approval of terrorist offences.

In addition, § 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code implements Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (this provision deals with preachers of hatred).

§§ 278f, 282a and 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code have been in force since 1 January 2012.

Belgium

A new DNA law of 7 November 2011 was adopted, where terrorism has been inserted in relation to adding the profile of convicted persons to the database of convicted persons.

Luxembourg

A law of 28 July 2011 implementing amendments (adopted on 8 July 2005) to the Vienna Convention, on the physical protection of nuclear materials, was adopted and could have an indirect/potential link to terrorist offences.

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